The global competition for critical minerals is entering a new phase. For much of the past decade, governments and investors have focused on securing access to lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel and rare earth elements to support the energy transition. This has given rise to initiatives such as the United States-led Minerals Security Partnership, now succeeded by the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE), the European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act and the RESourceEU Action Plan. The assumption behind many of these initiatives is that securing access to minerals by acquiring mining assets is essential to securing the industries of the future. While this is true in some respect, the latest International Energy Agency (IEA) Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 suggests that the reality is more complicated. Owning mineral deposits does not, by itself, confer strategic power. Increasingly, influence comes from controlling what happens after extraction which includes processing, refining, advanced manufacturing, technology and trade.
For Africa, this should prompt serious reflections. The continent possesses an extraordinary share of the world’s critical mineral wealth. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) dominates global cobalt production, while Zambia remains indispensable to copper supply and Zimbabwe occupy an important position in the global lithium supply chain. Similarly, South Africa is central to platinum group metals and manganese, while Namibia is emerging as an important producer of uranium and rare earth elements. Guinea remains the world’s largest exporter of bauxite, a mineral essential to the aluminium industry. These resources make Africa increasingly important to the global energy transition, but we should be careful not to confuse strategic importance with strategic advantage.
China’s advantage was built beyond the mine
One of the most important messages from the IEA’s latest Outlook is that concentration in mineral supply chains increasingly occurs in refining and processing rather than simply in mining. Excluding rare earths, the average share of the world’s largest refining country increased from 70% in 2023 to 72% in 2025. Over the past two years, China and Indonesia, in the case of nickel, accounted for more than three-quarters of global growth in refining capacity. For minerals such as manganese, graphite and nickel, virtually all new refining capacity came from the dominant supplier. This is important for countries in the West seeking to build alternative supply chains and reduce their dependence on China to understand how it arrived at this position. China did not become dominant simply by securing access to mineral deposits. Over several decades, it invested simultaneously in refining and smelting, chemical processing, battery manufacturing, industrial parks, logistics, engineering capacity and technology, while Chinese companies expanded overseas to secure access to mineral deposits and feedstock. In the late 1950s, it invested in rare earth processing and, by the 1970s, produced advanced rare earth products. By 2000, Chinese firms, many of which are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), controlled over half of global output through China’s vertically integrated mineral ecosystem. Major Chinese SOEs have been supported by government to expand and invest globally under the 1999 “Go Out” strategy. They benefitted from generous subsidies and tax credits approximately 200 billion annually and political risk insurance. Today the scale of this long-term strategy is visible in the battery supply chain wherein the accounts for almost 85% of global battery-cell production capacity, around 85% of cathode active-material production and more than 90% of anode active-material production according to the IEA’s 2026 Global EV Outlook. At the same time, Chinese firms moved aggressively into resource-rich but higher-risk jurisdictions where Western investors were often more cautious. In the DRC, for example, Chinese-backed companies owned or held stakes in 15 of the country’s 19 cobalt-producing mines by 2020, while Chinese state-owned banks provided approximately US$2.48 billion of the US$2.68 billion in credit used to finance China Molybdenum’s acquisition of the Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine. World’s largest EV maker, the Chinese company BYD, secured six African lithium mines, ensuring sufficient feedstock through 2032.
China therefore did not simply secure minerals; it built a vertically integrated system over time connecting overseas extraction to domestic processing, manufacturing and technology, giving Chinese companies greater control over where value is created across the mineral supply chain. the Recent Chinese export controls on rare earth elements, graphite, battery materials and manufacturing technologies illustrate the strategic importance of this industrial capacity. The IEA estimates that full implementation of some of these measures could put as much as US$6.5 trillion of downstream production outside China at risk across automotive, high-tech, defence and energy sectors.
For me, the biggest lesson is not Africa countries thinking of industrialization should replicate China’s model. It may never be possible or desirable to do so. Mineral wealth is only one part of the equation and other key factors like processing capacity, technology, infrastructure, skills and finance determine how much economic value a country ultimately captures. Even the developed economies with access to finance, skills and better infrastructure that are claim to be making progress to diversify from China are far off mark. One reports by EY-Parthenon estimates that the U.S., Eurozone, and UK would need to collectively invest an additional $23.6 trillion over the next 25 years in order to effectively stop relying on China in highly exposed sectors. This is where the debate about mineral export restrictions that are increasingly being used by resource rich countries becomes important. If these developed powers require billions of dollars to build the ecosystem on infrastructure for domestic refining, smelting, but also explorations to open new mines, what would it take for African resource rich countries.?
Export restrictions are not sufficient
Across Africa, governments are increasingly using export restrictions to pursue strategic objectives, including industrialisation and domestic value addition. So far about 13 African countries have introduced export restrictions, bans or beneficiation requirements. These include leading critical mineral producers such as Namibia, Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and the DRC. In 2025, Malawi also banned raw mineral exports. There is a reasonable economic argument behind some of these measures. Restricting exports can make raw materials more readily available to domestic processors and, under certain circumstances, provide an indirect cost advantage to downstream industries. The policy logic is understandable, particularly given that resource-rich countries have historically exported raw materials while importing finished products.
My concern, however, is what happens when governments introduce export restrictions without first building the industrial capacity to support them.An export ban without affordable electricity, transport infrastructure, technical skills, access to finance, processing facilities and predictable regulation may simply delay exports rather than create industries.
This is where I think African governments should be cautious about copying Indonesia as ‘the model’. Indonesia’s nickel export ban is frequently cited by as an example for other countries seeking to promote domestic processing. But the export ban did not operate in isolation. While it was not perfect, Indonesia accompanied it with significant investment in industrial parks such as Morowali and Weda Bay, as well as power, ports, roads and other infrastructure. These investments reduced the cost and risk of establishing processing capacity in Indonesia. The policy therefore formed part of a wider industrial strategy. I therefore caution African policymakers against overlooking the institutional and financial foundations that made Indonesia’s approach possible. An export restriction can create an incentive to process locally but needs to be accompanied by investments (sometimes from the state) in electricity, infrastructure, technology, skills or markets where these do not exist.
Geological power also matters
There is another important factor that governments should consider when using export restrictions to promote local value addition: how much control does the country actually have over the global market for the mineral? Indonesia occupies a strong position in global nickel markets, with substantial reserves and a dominant share of global nickel production. That gives it considerably more bargaining power than many African producers possess in their respective mineral markets.
The DRC, which produces more than 70% of the world’s cobalt and holds the largest cobalt reserves globally, also occupies a different position from many other African producers. When the DRC restricted cobalt exports in 2025, starting with a blanket ban in February and moving to a strict quota system in October, global supplies tightened sharply. Major miners such as Glencore stockpiled output and declared force majeure, contributing to a significant decline in intermediate shipments to major refiners such as those in China. The global cobalt prices subsequently surged from a nine-year low of roughly US$21,000 per tonne to more than US$48,000. That demonstrated a form of strategic power and the ability of a major producer to influence global supply and prices.
The same price impact cannot automatically be expected from every African producer. Zimbabwe’s sudden February 2026 restrictions on raw minerals and lithium concentrate, for example, had an immediate impact on global lithium supply chains because Zimbabwe had become a significant supplier of spodumene into China. The disruption created feedstock shortages for Chinese battery supply chains and contributed to a sharp market reaction. But the restrictions also created revenue pressures for the Zimbabwean government as some operations were suspended.
These are important factors for governments to consider. Before imposing export restrictions, policymakers need to understand both their geological position and their market position. A country with a relatively small share of global reserves may have much less ability to dictate market conditions. An ambitious export restriction could therefore create unintended consequences for domestic producers, investors, workers and government revenues without materially changing global market dynamics.
Technology can change the value of a mineral
Governments must also consider how quickly technology is changing. Chemists and material scientists are increasingly developing technologies that reduce or eliminate the use of particular minerals and metals. The push towards cobalt-free battery chemistry, for example, has moved from a theoretical objective to a market reality, particularly through the rapid expansion of lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries.
The same applies to lithium as sodium-ion batteries gain commercial attention. Sodium is considerably more abundant than lithium, and advances in sodium-ion technology could eventually reduce demand for lithium in some applications. This raises a difficult question for governments that require companies to invest billions of dollars in processing facilities: how long will the mineral retain its strategic value? Current market projections may indicate strong demand for lithium and cobalt over the next 10 to 15 years. But disruptive technology moves quickly and if new technologies reduce dependence on particular minerals, countries could find themselves with expensive processing infrastructure built around commodities whose strategic value has declined.This does not mean African governments should avoid beneficiation. It means they need to consider the sustainability and flexibility of the investments they are encouraging.
Instead of requiring every mining company to construct its own processing plant, governments could support shared facilities capable of processing feedstock from multiple producers. Such an approach could create economies of scale and reduce the risk of underutilized infrastructure. Zimbabwe provides an interesting example. The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development has encouraged Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe to process lithium ore from other producers through its newly built sulphate processing plant. However, the company has maintained that it designed the facility around its own ore and does not have the capacity to process material from other producers. Had government planned with companies well ahead, miners might have pooled resources to construct shared facilities. This also illustrates the difficulty of designing beneficiation policy without considering the commercial realities of individual processing facilities.
The cost-benefit question matters
Before introducing an export ban or restriction, governments should do a cost-benefit analysis and ask questions like: What will we gain, and what will it cost? This question is sometimes missing from beneficiation debates. A 2025 study by the Natural Resource Governance Institute, for example, has highlighted the economic challenges Ghana could face if it pursues domestic lithium processing under current conditions, including high capital costs, limited feedstock and limited refining expertise. These factors can significantly affect whether domestic processing is commercially viable. The IEA’s findings reinforce this point. New refining projects outside established dominant suppliers can face capital costs that are 20% to more than 150% higher, while operating costs are, on average, around 50% higher. Infrastructure gaps, skills shortages and lengthy permitting processes add further difficulties.
These are not reasons for African countries to abandon value addition and beneficiation strategies but rather to inform how governments should design them. Zimbabwe provides a useful example. The government has pushed mining companies towards greater processing and increasingly expects companies to address their own energy requirements. But if a company must generate its own electricity because the national grid cannot reliably supply it, the economics of beneficiation change considerably.
I have spoken to mining executives who question whether some of the requirements being placed on companies are commercially realistic. That perspective should not automatically determine policy, but governments should listen to it. If the economics do not work, a regulation can exist on paper without producing the industrial transformation it was intended to achieve.
The same applies when governments expect companies to process material from other producers. If Zimbabwe wants a central lithium chemical-processing facility capable of taking feedstock from several mines, that may make more economic sense than requiring every company to build its own facility. But such arrangements need to be negotiated clearly in advance and ensure that state support in establishing the commercial, regulatory and infrastructure framework necessary to make shared processing viable.
Beneficiation should not stop at the border
This is where I think the African beneficiation debate needs to become more nuanced. In our understandable pursuit of domestic value addition, we sometimes frame beneficiation too narrowly around national borders where policy makers want processing, refining and smelting to be mined within national borders. But for a continent seeking to industrialise, the more important questions should sometimes be around how we leverage on regional competitive and comparative advantages to build capacities to move up the value chain.?
Africa does not need every country to build every part of a mineral value chain. Instead, countries should leverage their different competitive and comparative advantages to build regional value chains. Lithium mined in Zimbabwe, for example, could be processed further in South Africa for example where the necessary infrastructure, technical capabilities and industrial ecosystem already exist. Additionally, Zambia could potentially serve as a regional copper-processing hub, with neighbouring countries contributing feedstock and benefiting from the infrastructure and markets that emerge around it. Other regional hubs could similarly specialise in processing, refining or smelting particular minerals, allowing countries to pool resources and build economies of scale. This is precisely where regional economic integration becomes important. Yet, in practice, national interests and nationalist approaches to industrial policy often trump regional economic integration. Even within SADC, where regional integration is an explicit policy objective, governments have not always created the policy environment necessary for businesses to operate across borders and build integrated regional value chains. Governments often compete for the same investments, seek to establish similar processing facilities and prioritize domestic ownership and production even where a regional approach could produce greater economic value.
If every country insists that minerals must be processed domestically before they can cross its borders, we risk fragmenting the very regional value chains that the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and regional economic communities such as SADC are trying to develop. Zimbabwe’s platinum sector illustrates the challenge. Since 2013 Zimbabwe has been pushing platinum producers to establish refining capacity locally. However, platinum mining companies like Mimosa Mining Company owned by Impala Platinum Holdings, Unki Mine Valterra Platinum (formerly Anglo-American Platinum) have consistently pointed to the existing PGM refining infrastructure technical expertise and accumulated investment in South Africa. While plausible, I do not think the answer is simply to accept the companies’ position and abandon Zimbabwe’s beneficiation ambitions. But neither should Zimbabwe design its beneficiation policy as though South Africa does not exist. If South Africa already has economically viable platinum-refining capacity, Zimbabwe could use that capacity as part of a regional platinum value chain while simultaneously developing additional capabilities at home. The objective should be to ensure that Zimbabwe captures a greater share of the value generated from its platinum resources while also ensuring that the wider region develops more sophisticated industrial capabilities.
This is not unusual in successful industrial systems. The aerospace industry provides a useful illustration of how regional integration, supported by strategic state intervention, can enable private actors to build an integrated industrial ecosystem across national borders. Airbus offers a particularly instructive example. Its origins can be traced to a 1967 agreement between the French, German and British governments to deepen cooperation in aviation technology and develop the capacity to compete with American manufacturers such as Boeing. Rather than each country attempting to build a globally competitive aerospace industry independently, the participating states pooled capabilities, capital, technology and markets across borders. The result was a regional industrial ecosystem in which different countries could specialise in different stages of production while collectively building a globally competitive European industry.
Africa can apply a similar logic to critical minerals. The objective of beneficiation should not necessarily be to ensure that every stage of mineral processing takes place within the borders of the country where extraction occurs. A blanket export restriction that prevents minerals from moving to a neighbouring African country that already possesses the capacity to process, refine or smelt them could, in fact, undermine regional industrialisation. It may protect one country’s processing ambitions in the short term while preventing the emergence of a larger, more competitive regional value chain. This approach may require governments to compromise on the idea that every mineral must be fully processed domestically
The more strategic approach is therefore to ask not only where a mineral is extracted, but where across the region different stages of the value chain can be performed most efficiently and competitively. One country may have the mineral reserves, another may have relatively cheap and reliable energy, another may possess established processing or refining capacity, while another may have the infrastructure, skills or manufacturing base necessary for downstream production. Regional integration can allow these comparative advantages to be combined rather than duplicated. Policy makers therefore need to distinguish between restricting the export of raw minerals out of Africa and restricting the movement of minerals within Africa. Currently, this is missing in most critical minerals export restrictions and beneficiation policies.
That is why I would caution against both extremes of doing nothing and allowing raw mineral exports to continue indefinitely or introducing blanket export bans without asking whether the necessary industrial ecosystem exists. The better approach is not easy but demands that policy makers in mining ministries, trade and industry, finance understand the economics of each mineral, and invest alongside the private sector, negotiate smarter investment agreements to leverage on regional comparative advantages.
